Udagawa, Yoshie --- "We Don't Become Adults, but are Told to Be Adults: The Emergence of Adultification in Japan" [2023] IntJlCrimJustSocDem 21; (2023) 12(2) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy (2024)

We Don’t Become Adults, but are Told to Be Adults: The Emergence ofAdultification in Japan

Yoshie Udagawa

The University of Tokyo, Japan

Abstract

Keywords: Juvenile law reforms; responsibility; adultification;neoliberalism; public policy; public opinion.

Introduction

There has been along-standing debate over viewing a child as someone in need of protection andguidance or as an independent beingnaturally endowed with an innate ability forself-determination. This has been an aporia over the centuries, as has thedividingline between adult and child. This conflict manifested in myriad waysinternationally, and Japanese involvement with this strugglehas been reflectedin the Civil Code and in juvenile law, particularly in changing definitions ofthe age of adulthood since the1990s. Since debates over the definition ofchildhood have accompanied these discussions of Japan’s legal system, theloweringof the voting age from 20 to 18 in 2015 may be said to have emerged indirect response to the childhood debates (Mainichi Shimbun2017). Moreover, theJapanese government amended the law in 2018, lowering the legal age of adulthoodfrom 20 to 18—a changethat took effect in 2022. Discussions on loweringthe age of majority then shifted toward the application of the JuvenileAct. Instead of similarly changing the age of criminal majority, a new legalframework was established and enacted for justice-involvedyouth, specificallythose aged 18 to 19 (Ito 2021).

Based on the surrounding discussion, this amendment is considered atransitional or an iterative move toward the original goal oflowering the ageof juvenile law in the future. Globally, several countries have decided tochange the upper age limit of the juvenilejustice system, either to betteraccommodate adolescents in the transition from childhood to adulthood or to usea more repressiveapproach toward justice-involved youth (Schmidt, Rap andLiefaard 2021: 173). The legal framework in the Netherlands provides anexampleof the former, one in which young adults between the ages of 18 and 21 who wereinvolved in the justice system could alreadybe subject to juvenile sentences,but the country also applied scientific insights on youth development andmaturation to the legislativereforms, raising the upper age limit from 21 to 23in 2014 (Schmidt, Rap and Liefaard 2021: 173). Likewise, the trend in the UnitedStates (US) in recent years has been to raise the age of juvenile courtjurisdiction so that young people “have access to moreage-appropriateservices and placement options to meet their specialized needs” (NationalConference of State Legislatures2015). The legal reform in Japan is consideredthe latter case, one that downplays evidence-based data and scientific insights.Severalscholars have discussed global reforms similar to Japan’s inconnection with the effects of neoliberalism, which positionsyouth asautonomous and self-possessed individuals responsible for their actions andwhich regards crime as an individual issue ratherthan a public one (Hall 2011;Harvey 2005; Turner 2014).

Similarly, the global debate about expecting young people to be autonomousindividuals manifested in discussions on the age of maturityin the Civil Codein Japan, where young people are being targeted for fraud or sexualexploitation, such as forced pornographic performance,because their judgment isimmature, and their knowledge of the law is inadequate for the challengesconfronting them (Mainichi Shimbun2017; Tadokoro 2022; Yoneda 2021). In termsof human maturity, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2008: 63) inJapan providedthe guideline that a human life can be divided into six lifestages, with adolescence/young adulthood being the period 15 to 24 yearsold.Adolescence is further described as the period of time “when reproductivefunctions are physically completed and the transitionfrom childhood toadulthood takes place” as well as “when the life environment changesdrastically as a result of employment,... and the individual acquires thelifestyle habits of an adult” (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare2008: 64). Adolescenceis also considered an important transitional period, andthe fact that the brain develops until the mid-twenties supports this fromascientific standpoint (Arain et al. 2013). Therefore, lowering the legal age ofadulthood by two years implicitly seeks to shortenthis preparatory period.However, at the institutional, social, and educational levels, preparation formaturity has not kept pacewith this change. For instance, policymakers andpoliticians hoped that lowering the voting age by two years in the Civil Code in2015 would increase voter turnout, an expectation that went unrealized (JapanEducational Press 2019). In reality, citizenship educationis still in itsinfancy, while teachers are required to be overly neutral on controversialpolitical topics and schools seem to bestruggling to provide a space forlearning democratic debate (Hisada 2021; Tanaka 2021). While changes such asthese imply that schooleducation in Japan avoids discussing controversial andsensitive topics for fear of fostering prejudice and discrimination, onechild-culturescholar pointed out that children need to learn how to discussissues in public to prepare them to become “legal persons”and thatschools should provide that in their education (Nakajima 2022). Thus, legalredefinition of adulthood requires integratingmany fields, including educationand social welfare, for the gestalt solution to permeate the general public, butthe currently proposedlinkage does not appear to be functioning well. Whiledifficult to demonstrate vis-à-vis specific evidence, it is hard toshakethe impression that the law is being driven by the interests and agendas ofthose in power, leaving those most affected inan unenviable position.

Ultimately, the public sphere and official policy need to interrogate whatlowering the age of adulthood implies toward the young,especiallyjustice-involved youth; careful consideration would further ask whether therewere new expectations or imaginings aboutthem and, if so, what thoseexpectations implied. Youth are frequently exploited or denigratedinternationally, making an investigationinto criminal policy toward juvenilesparticularly relevant. Thus, the purpose of this study is to explore how thepower dynamicsof marginalization, normalization, and objectification manifestedin the debates on juvenile justice reform. It is critical to examinethe socialand historical context of the concept of a child and childhood prior to theselegal changes. This study aims to questionthe concept of childhood within theframework of justice-involved youth. It uses secondary data analysis anddiscourse analysis onthe relation between public opinion, the media, and thelegal system in connection with the emergence of adultification—theforcedtransition from child to adult influenced by media representation, as defined byPostman (1994)—and its problems forsociety: the promotion ofmarginalization and the imposition of self-responsibility on individuals. Theprocess of maturing fromchild to adult requires learning, specifically learningnot being pushed by responsibility. This study also suggests how the voicesofthose who are most affected by this law (e.g., the justice-involved youththemselves) were absent from the discussion.

The Late-Modern History of Juvenile Crime and Children in Japan

The 1990s were a period of remarkable transition in children’s rightsaround the world and in the history of youth justice involvementin Japanparticularly. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child wereadopted in 1989, and Japan ratified it in 1994.This marked a turning point forchildren under 18 because they were recognized, officially and globally, to holdtheir own rights,including the right to have a secure and safe livingenvironment, the right to be protected from harm, and the right to be treatedwith respect as an individual human being. Meanwhile, notions ofself-determination, freedom, and responsibility, being debated onseveralfronts, were also expanded to children. The application of these notionsextended into the functionality of juvenile law,coinciding with a rise in thenumber of juvenile crimes and the media’s focus on the brutal nature ofmany of these crimesin Japan. People were astonished to learn of such crimes,wondering how juveniles could commit such cruel acts without adult involvement.This consternation led to a change in the conception of the child or juvenilefrom the conventional image of a dependent being inneed of protection to animpression of an independent being with the same responsibility and conscienceas an adult. Accordingly,notions of childhood began to change during the1990s.

In Japan from the 1990s into the 2000s, juvenile crime was linked to theimage of “snapped kids” (kireru kodomo), those children whosuffer a mental break and act out of control (Doi 2003: 51–52, 198, 294).Doi (2003: 294, 299) noted thatdepictions of snapped kids were generallyimpulsive, cruel, and ominous and were associated in public discourse with thephrase “darknessin the heart” (kokoro no yami). The mediacirculated popular images of contemporary youth, including self-isolatingindividuals like those who sequester in theirown room, rejecting any contactwith society (hikikomori). This conception was produced and influencedprimarily by the appalling murders committed by a 14-year-old boy in 1997, knownafterwardas the Sakakibara incident. The Sakakibara incident is remembered asone of the most brutal murders committed by a minor, leadingto changes in thejuvenile justice system. The incident involved a 14-year-old, referred to as“Boy A,” who, unassisted,committed two homicides and three assaults(though it was not initially recognized as a series of linked attacks). One ofthese crimes,the murder of an 11-year-old mentally handicapped boy, receivedmassive and continuous media coverage. The media reported this murderas anextraordinarily eerie event, and they released descriptions of the offender as apsychopathic, perverted adult man (Asahi Shimbun1997; Mainichi Shimbun 1997:29; Takao 1997: 42–44). The murder was immediately shocking due to itscruelty and brutality;then it was revealed that the offender was a 14-year-oldboy and that the incident was one of a series of attacks. The incident hadalready been presented as controversial to entice media and public attention,and the media’s portrayal of the incident furthercontributed to the moralpanic before Boy A was arrested. Media reports provide evidence of howtransmitted information was exaggeratedand inaccurate under the panic and howmassive media coverage accelerated the social phenomenon of moral panic andamplified fearamong the public.

In their portrayals of the culprit, the mediaemphasized the psychotic aspect of Boy A; therefore, it left the public withmany fearsand unanswered questions. Indeed, the media excessively covered theevent despite this restless state of affairs, and reporters attemptedto draw aclear picture of the entire matter. Further, for Japanese society, this casehighlighted the way justice-involved youthwere treated under juvenile law, asBoy A was sent to a juvenile training school for the purpose of correction andrehabilitationinstead of being punished, and his identity was not disclosed tothe public or the media due to hopes for his future reintegrationinto society.The media attempted to correct what they perceived as unfairness caused by thejuvenile law, which they interpretedas “overprotecting” theoffender. One media source reported Boy A’s picture and real name, andthis decision prompteda controversial debate over media ethics since doing sowas a violation of juvenile law (Oishi 2005). Although reporting the identityofa justice-involved youth was and still is against the principles of Japanesejuvenile law, the justice system could not enforcethis provision, and nopenalty was given for the violation. Due to the lack of legal consequences, thequestion of how to reportjuvenile crimes was left to the judgment of each mediaoutlet (Oishi 2005: 195).

This incident was said to trigger other juvenile crimes. The number ofjuvenile crimes in 1997 increased by approximately 3,000 cases(from 23,242 to26,125), particularly in the categories considered heinous, such as robbery,bodily harm, blackmailing, and theft(Ministry of Justice 2021b). At that time,a criminal activity called oyaji-gari, which involves a group ofjuveniles targeting and robbing middle-aged men, was on the rise (NationalPolice Agency 1997). Withinthis context, the memory of Boy A persisted, havingbecome a major representation of serious juvenile offenders in Japan. In thepublic’s eyes, justice-involved youth were inhumane and monstrous bynature and had no possibility of being rehabilitated.This idea intensified whenBoy A published his autobiography in 2015. The publication of the autobiographywas bitterly attackedby the media, critics, and the victims’ families,who claimed that Boy A intended to profit by flaunting his past acts beforethepublic and that his profit-seeking proved that he had no remorse for his actions(Hisano et al. 2015; Nikkei Shimbun 2015b; SankeiShimbun 2015, Shukan Bunshun2016). The father of the victim argued that Boy A should reveal his real namesince he was no longera minor (Shukan Bunshun 2016). Moreover, the familymembers of the victims severely criticized Boy A for not informing them inadvanceabout the publication, expressing that they felt betrayed and insulted,especially because they thought that he had the opportunityto notify them(Hisano et al. 2015; Nikkei Shimbun 2015b; Sankei Shimbun 2015). Thevictims’ families protested the publicationof the autobiography andrequested that the publisher collect all copies from bookstores; the publisherrefused their request, andconsequently, many bookstores refused to sell theautobiography out of respect for the victims’ families (Nikkei Shimbun2015b).Subsequently, the vilification of justice-involved youth was widelyaccepted and disseminated by Japanese society, and justice-involvedyouth werethought to impulsively commit brutal crimes for no reason or at theirconvenience. Boy A contributed significantly toforming this image of“juvenile delinquents/offenders” that has deeply pervaded Japanesesociety.

As in the case of Boy A, and in the generalportrayal of justice-involved youth in the 90s, the media plays a critical rolein thedevelopment of social anxiety and moral panics by using exaggerated andcontroversial imagery to make events appear more scandalous,thus, amplifyingpublic fear. However, an image of a certain group or category is shaped based onthe specific individuals or eventsincluded, and it does not entirely representthe group or the disparate voices of its members, despite one voice beingconveyed tosociety as dominant. In Japan, Boy A is recognized as a dominantvoice for justice-involved youth, lessening the diversity of delinquents’voices and eliding the many factors that affect juvenile crime. For instance,many delinquents are survivors of domestic violence,neglect, poverty, and/orschool bullying (Abe 2018; Hazama 2018). Additionally, developmental disordersare considered one of thepossible compounding causes of delinquent acts(Fujikawa 2009). Thus, some scholars and legal practitioners emphasize the needforearly legal or social intervention to prevent juvenile crime (Abe 2018).However, Japanese public perception is formed based on themajor discourse ofjuvenile crime, which often centers on individual problems and misses socialproblems that would be evident froma holistic view, potentially reflecting amore general failure to consider broader contexts. Resolving this discrepancywould facilitatethe public understanding of juvenile crime as a personalproblem for the justice-involved youth and promotes conclusions that justifytheir exclusion from society.

Literature Review

After infamous juvenile crimes occurred consecutively in the 1990s,controversy arose in Japan over whether the juvenile law shouldbe amended inresponse to public opinion or victims’ lobbying (Ellis and Kyo 2017). Theamendments are understood to take amore punitive stance toward justice-involvedyouth, as legislators and judges began to pay close attention to how the publicwouldreact to their judgments. In a principle widely accepted by the globalcommunity, the law is formally outside the state’s politicalprocess andstands above the general public; moreover, its rituals and conventions serve tokeep its activities out of the publiceye and away from the force of publiccriticism (Hall et al. 2013: 36). However, contrary to principle, the cases ofthe United Kingdom(UK), the US, and Japan suggest an important aspect of how toaccount for experts, the multiple voices of the public, those affectedby thelaw, as well as those who practice it. For instance, Hall et al. (2013: 37)indicate that, in the UK, the rise in crime wasportrayed as an inevitableconsequence of “the weakening [of] moral authority,” that the youthwere “the groupmost at risk in this process,” and that violence wasthe most tangible measure of this vulnerability. After assiduously examiningthemoral panic phenomenon associated with mugging within an extensive context andfrom diverse perspectives, Hall et al. (2013)concluded that this phenomenon ledto marginalization of and racial prejudice against youth of color, justificationof social controlby the police, and more severe punishment for juvenile crimesin response to public outcries. They also stated that the judiciaryand massmedia lay behind a process driving “how the public ‘makessense’ of the situation, what actions will befound politically acceptableand legitimate, [and] to what consent is given” (Hall et al. 2013: xiii).There is no doubt thatthe government continuously seeks to gain the support ofthe public and, accordingly, to either reflect public opinion in policyormanipulate it in support of policy. Conversely, as Hutchinson (2005) pointedout, lawmakers are loath to appear soft on crimesince doing so could spell theend of their political careers. However, careful attention observes that publicopinion does not necessarilyderive from facts, but rather from information thatsounds understandable, reasonable, or convincing to the audience.

The evolution of public opinion includes a myriad collection of influences.Official statistics and evidence-based studies clearlyprove that the beliefs ofthe majority of Japanese residents do not reflect the facts regarding juvenilecrime; on the contrary,the discussion around amending juvenile law disregardeddata and scientific insight and placed value on enacting “publicopinion”as it currently existed rather than on correcting publicmisperceptions. Hence, it is important to discern what consequences mayresultfrom policies that are inconsistent with data, scientific insights, and socialrealities, especially when public opinion formedfrom misunderstanding and falseinformation implicitly or explicitly influenced legal reform. In this regard,Japan is not unique,as such misunderstandings and misperceptions of juvenilecrime are an international phenomenon (Goidel, Freeman and Procopio 2006;Hallet al. 2013; Ruigrok et al. 2016).

As another aspect of public perception on juveniles, some studies(Antolak-Saper 2020; Benekos and Merlo 2008; Bolin, Applegate andOuellette2021) examined the adultification phenomenon by questioning the treatment ofjustice-involved youth under the law. Benekoand Marlo (2008) noted that onesign of the adultification of the juvenile justice system was the increase inyouth being tried incriminal courts and incarcerated in adult prisons followingthe decline in the use of judicial waivers in the US since the mid-1990s.Theshift away from adultification policies was seen in 2005 with the decision ofRoper v. Simmons, in which the US Supreme Court exempted defendants underthe age of 18 from the death penalty and reaffirmed that juveniles are differentfrom adults (Bolin, Applegate and Ouellette 2021). Bolin, Applegate andOuellette (2021) found that, at the level of the generalpublic, “theretends to be a persistent belief among Americans that juvenile crime is rising,and kids are much worse todaythan in previous decades” (18), whilebelieving in the importance of rehabilitation with “greatest emphasis ongoalsoriented toward child saving” (11). Bolin, Applegate and Ouellette(2021) concluded that although they found that the relativemajority supportsblended sentencing on juveniles, depending on the crime under consideration andthe presence of a criminal record,people followed juvenile justice policy inreinforcing the distinction between juveniles and adults.

In the history of juvenile justice, the US and Japan originally adopted thewelfare model, whereas Australian youth justice developedseparately from adultcriminal justice (Antolak-Saper 2020). However, there were some sharedexperiences among these countries interms of the “tough on crime”wave, adultification of the juvenile justice system, and media reporting onjuvenile crime.Referring to the Victorian State Government’s 2017 reformsof the youth justice system, Antolak-Saper (2020) noted that theimplementationof “law and order” reform leads to the adultification of thejuvenile justice system, barely addressingthe fundamental causes of juvenilecrime (i.e., socioeconomic disadvantages, child abuse, or family environment)over which childrenhave little control. According to Antolak-Saper (2020),adultification generally consists of two waves: the “tough on crime”wave, responding to justice-involved youth who committed a serious crime, andthe “due process” wave, which recognizesthe same rights forjustice-involved youths as for adults. The latter, while seemingly reasonable,shows little distinction fromthe adult criminal justice system (Antolak-Saper2020).

Adultification based on the combination of these two waves can be seen inJapan’s juvenile justice reforms, which barely maintainthe welfare modelin their framework. Moreover, in Japanese society, which has an ageingpopulation and declining birthrate, thisadultification removes protectiveinterventions and produces more adults who contributes to society. However,there is uncertaintyas to whether this adultification policy will continue,advance, or regress in the future, as the government is required to addressvarious issues around the youth, including high suicide rates, poverty, youngcarers, 2021 child abuse, and school bullying. Therefore,to grasp the powerdynamics and fallacies behind such policy decisions—as well as thepossible consequences of the adultificationpolicies—it is necessary tostudy the issues of public understanding of juvenile issues and to proposefuture directions forthe juvenile justice system.

Methodology

Applying the approach of Hall et al. (2013) to depict the relation betweenrepressive state structures, capitalism, and neoliberalglobalization, and usingsecondary data analysis and discourse analysis, this study investigated theemergence of adultificationbased on the relations between public opinion, themedia, and the legislative proceedings through the case of juvenile crime anddelinquency. The study particularly aimed to examine the media’s role informing opinions, the gap between public belief andthe facts, and theprevalence of misconceptions. Secondary data were drawn from both officialgovernment statistics, such as thepolice, as well as data from nonprofitorganizations; these sources were used to analyze public opinion and perceptionstoward juvenilelaw and crime. Discourse analysis was conducted to explore howthese perceptions and misperceptions were implicitly brought intothe debate onjuvenile law reform. Public opinion and perceptions are generally vague,elusive, and often speculative, and thereis no established method to capturethem accurately. However, the purpose of this study is to document not only theforces influencingpublic opinion and perceptions, but also those surroundingchildhood debates. Though challenging, this study attempts to providesomeinsight into neoliberal trends and power dynamics in the Japanese context.

Secondary Data Analysis: Official Statistics

There is a significant gap between actual data and public opinion on juvenilecrime. For instance, the Japanese government conducteda public opinion poll in2010 and 2015 regarding juvenile crime. The 2015 result indicated that 78.6% ofa total of 1,773 respondentsthought that juvenile crime was going up, and only2.5% believed the number of youth crimes was on the decline (Cabinet Office,Governmentof Japan 2015). Compared to the survey in 2010, more respondentsanswered that juvenile crime is on the rise in 2015 (Figure 1).On the trend ofjuvenile delinquency, about half of the respondents—47.6% in 2010 and45.9% in 2015—answered that thenumber of delinquents involved in viciousand violent acts was increasing (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2015).The Kanagawa Newspaper documented the critical fact that in 2015 almost80% of respondents believed that serious juvenile crime was increasing, andabouthalf of them assumed that heinous juvenile crime was also on the rise(Kawashima 2019).

Figure 1: The public opinion of juvenile crime

(Based on The Public Opinion Poll on Juvenile Crime 2010and 2015 by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan)

However, statistical data from the White Paper on Crime 2021 by theMinistry of Justice (Figures 2 and 3) and the Overview of Juvenile Probationand Protection by the National Police Agency in 2022 (Figure 4) thoroughlyrebut this public belief. Indeed, both the total number of justice-involvedyouth and repeat offenders is decreasing (Figures 2 and 3). The data on juvenileoffenses by type of crime indicate that felony andviolent crimes have beendecreasing, while intellectual and moral crimes are staying the same (Figure 4).Larceny accounts for morethan half of total juvenile offenses, although it isalso on the decline. This result clarifies that justice-involved youth werefarmore likely to commit misdemeanors than felonious or violent crimes, andaccordingly, the data do not support the common assumptionthat justice-involvedyouth are becoming more dangerous. Moreover, the 2022 data from the NationalPolice Agency suggest that theratio of justice-involved youth to the totaljuvenile population has fallen in the past 10 years (Figure 5); factors besidesthedecline of the juvenile population likely explain the decrease ofjustice-involved youth such as stable social control and successfulrehabilitation and social reintegration of justice-involved youth. Overall,these data exculpate specific issues of parenthood andhighlight current trendsand characteristics of justice-involved youth and the need to focus on thesocioeconomic aspects of crimeto address the problem.

Figure 2: Numbers of juvenile offenders and delinquents

(Based on White Paper on Crime 2021 by the Ministryof Justice in Japan)

Figure 3: Juvenile offenders and the ratio of repeatoffenders

(Based on White Paper on Crime 2021 by the Ministryof Justice in Japan)

Figure 4: Offense types and numbers

(Based on Overview of Juvenile Probation andProtection by National Police Agency in 2022)

Note: 1=Juvenile offenders 2=Juveniles 14-19

Figure 5: Percentage of juvenile offenders in totaljuvenile population age 14-19

(Based on Overview of Juvenile Probation andProtection by National Police Agency in 2022)

As described earlier, the two types of data above clearly indicate thatpublic opinion does not reflect the actual data and that thereis a gap betweenthe two. However, this gap also implies another problem: the lack of knowledgeand interest in youth issues. TheNippon Foundation conducted a public opinionpoll regarding the amendment of the Juvenile Act in March 2021, targeting1,000 people aged 17 to 19. The results revealed that 39.8% of the respondentshad no idea about the proposedamendment to the Juvenile Act, 45.6%vaguely knew, and only 14.6% were aware of it. When asked about the newframework for “Specified Juveniles (TokuteiShōnen)” to expand the type of crimes subject to adult courtsproceedings, 58.2% agreed with the expansion. However, among those whoagreedwith the expansion, only 35.7% believed that it would be effective in reducingthe number of crimes committed (25.4%) or deterringrecidivism (10.3%). Also,55.0% agreed with the statement “even juveniles need to fulfill the socialresponsibility when theycommit a crime.” These results suggest that themajority of young people were neither interested in nor aware of the amendment,that about 20% of the total respondents believed in the effectiveness ofrepressive law as social control, and that about 30% expectedjustice-involvedyouth to hold social responsibility for their acts.

Hence, these data conclude that public perception of juvenile crime is notformed based on scientific or empirical data and actualstatistics; instead,perception might be largely driven by the stereotypical image of delinquentsreinforced by the media. For instance,there is a common narrative, reported bythe media, that the ratio of repeat offenders is increasing, and the publicbelieves itto be true (Yanai 2016). This narrative derives from that data that,while the ratio of repeat offenders has slowly increased by15% in the past 20years (Figure 3), the overall number of justice-involved youth as well asthe overall number of youth with repeatedjustice interactions both declined,resulting in the appearance of greater recidivism because of the smaller samplesize. However,Okabe (2015) pointed out that this data itself is debatable, asthe ratio of repeat offenders is not the same as the recidivism rate,and thereis little or no data on recidivism in Japan, especially in the area of juveniledelinquency. The media extract this particulardata point from other relateddata, including the frequency and nature of juvenile crime and delinquency, andreport that “recidivismgets higher.” Yanai (2016) suggested thatsuch misleading reports are common in the major media corporations in Japan,includingNippon Hoso Kyokai, Asahi Shimbun, and YomiuriShimbun. This narrative is apparently shaped from a fragment of the entirepicture, missing the critical points: the overall numbers of juvenileoffensesand justice-involved youth are declining, and there is no evidence to suggestthe recidivism rate of justice-involved juvenilesis necessarily on therise.

It is problematic and often criticized as duplicitous for the media to focuson fragmentary information, disregarding the larger context,because it misleadsand misinforms the general public. More importantly, this process hasintentionally shifted the perceived locusof the problem from society to theindividual, giving the impression that juvenile crime is due to personal andindividual issues.In addition to the impact of violent imagery on publicsentiment, such misleading reporting has contributed to public misunderstandingand discrimination against justice-involved youth, resulting in a predominanttrend toward neoliberal thinking. Having examined therelations among the mediareporting, opinion formation, the discrepancies between public belief and thefacts, and the prevalenceof misconceptions, this study next explores how thesefactors affect the debate on juvenile law reform and the policymakingprocess.

Discourse Analysis: Debates on Amendment of Juvenile Law and LegalReform

In 2015, one juvenile crime caught the public’s attention, and thethen-chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party’s PolicyResearch Council(Jimin Tōh) declared to the press that “juvenile crime isbecoming extremely brutal. It will be necessary to consider whether there needsto be a change on the current Juvenile law for crime prevention” (NikkeiShimbun 2015a). Among the other responses, this commentseemingly triggered anopen debate. The Japanese government considered lowering the upper age ofjuvenile law to match the CivilCode in response to public support for amendingthe juvenile law toward a more punitive stance (Mainichi Shimbun 2019). In 2017,in response to a government request, the Legislative Council of the Ministry ofJustice (Hōsei Shingikai) began considering such an amendment to theJuvenile Act (Mainichi Shimbun 2019). Lowering the age of criminalmajority from 20 to 18 in Japan (Shōnen Hō nenrei hikisage) wasthe main theme of the discussion, and it took three years to reach a conclusionregarding the amendment. In May 2021, the debateconcluded with a decisionthat a new legal framework would be established and enacted for justice-involvedyouth from 18 to 19 tobecome effective in 2022 (Ito 2021), instead of loweringthe upper age of criminal majority. However, this amendment is still considered,from the process of its discussion, as merely the first step toward the originalgoal of lowering the age in the future. Under thisframework, offenders betweenthe ages of 18 and 19 are defined as “Specified Delinquent (TokuteiShōnen)” and will be tried either as a juvenile or as an adultoffender, depending on the severity of the offense. This policy expandsthecases in adult courts for offenders aged 18 and 19. Moreover, there are otherchanges in the amendments; for instance, the prohibitionon reportingminors’ real names is removed for specified delinquents who commit seriouscrimes and are to be tried in adultcourts. The Ministry of Justice (2021a)offers the following explanation for lifting the prohibition:

It is considered appropriate to prosecute in open court and pursue criminalresponsibility for specified juveniles who have been heldresponsible for theiracts due to the lowering of the voting age and the age of majority under theCivil Code and to subject themto social criticism and commentary.

In addition, recent changes lowered the age of pre-delinquent offense to 17,meaning that those over 18 are now considered adultsand, therefore, no longereligible for protective intervention. Thus, this amendment forces individualsover the age of 18 into responsibleadulthood.

However, there remains significant doubt as to the necessity of these legalchanges, especially considering the previous juvenilelaw’s effectivenessin the rehabilitation of justice-involved youth. Experts, including lawyers andacademics, expressed seriousconcerns that this amendment may produce potentialnegative consequences, such as higher recidivism rates, particularly amongjustice-involvedyouth between 18 and 19 who lose educational and rehabilitativeopportunities as well as job opportunities due to real name reporting(Katayamaet al. 2021; Kuzuno, Takeuchi and Honjo 2020). They also argued that educationis more effective in rehabilitation ratherthan punishment and prison labor and,therefore, should be prioritized since scientific research data and fact-basedreasoning havenot indicated that children today are any more mature than theyused to be (Katayama et al. 2021; Kuzuno, Takeuchi and Honjo 2020).

These discussions revived recurrent issues about the definition of minors inthe justice system and measures for holding minors accountable.In the Japanesejustice system, minors have gradually emerged as a responsible entity throughprevious amendments to the juvenilelaw. Since the 1990s, cases involvingjuveniles have been continuously reported in Japan’s media, capturingpublic attentionand leading to the establishment of new juvenile-relatedprostitution and pornography laws in 1999 and an amendment to juvenile lawin2000. The legal system’s approach to minors has been under reconsiderationsince then.

The amendments of 2000 introduced new systems:prosecutor participation, three judges, and victims’ impact statements;theyalso lowered the minimum age required for minors to be transferred to adultcourt from 16 to 14, depending on the crime (Takumi 2017).This amendment wasthe first overhaul of juvenile law since its implementation in 1949 (enacted in1948) when American-inspired discoursewas first adopted in the US-dominatedpostwar Japanese system. This change prompted three other amendments of juvenilelaw in 2007,2008, and 2014. The 2007 amendment lowered the minimum age forminors to be sent to juvenile training schools from 14 to 12, and,in the thirdamendment in 2008, the Victim Participation System was introduced through therevision of the Code of Criminal Procedurein juvenile justice (Takumi 2017). Inthe Victim Participation System, victims and bereaved family members in certaincases are allowedto participate in the proceedings by attending the trial andquestioning the accused (Ministry of Justice n.d.). This system raisedconcernsabout justice-involved youth and the family court system, which centers onrehabilitation. The 2014 amendment raised themaximum prison term from 15 to 20years for minors who commit a felonious crime under 18, taking into account thebalance with thePenal Code (Takeuchi 2013: 187). According to Takeuchi (2013:188), in the process of these four amendments, a new structure hasbeenestablished, one where prosecutors are deeply involved in legislation as atraditional legal authority and where the representativesof victims’organizations are actively involved in the legislative process. As such, theamendments are understood to be instillinga newly punitive stance towardjustice-involved youth, following public opinion (Ellis and Kyo 2017). In otherwords, taking a punitivestance toward young potential offenders impliesblurring the boundary between minor and adult or pushing the liminal spacetowarda more adult domain.

In 2017, in response to a government request, the Legislative Council of theMinistry of Justice began discussing amending the Juvenile Act, includinglowering the age of criminal majority from 20 to 18 (Mainichi Shimbun 2019). Ifthe system determined that there was agood possibility for rehabilitation, asdefined within prevailing concepts of juvenile delinquency, the justice-involvedyouth was“treated” rather than penalized. In the most recentdiscussion of the amendment of juvenile law, not only legal expertsandacademics but also the members of the Legislative Council of the Ministry ofJustice (2020b: 11) considered that the juvenilelaw is effective for therehabilitation of the justice-involved youth. Therefore, strong objections andconcerns were raised to thisamendment, charging that lowering the upper agewould lead to higher recidivism (Katayama et al. 2021; Kuzuno, Takeuchi andHonjo2020).

According to a member of the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice,the debate over the amendment remained within the theoreticalframework and didnot reach its practical goal because it originated with the impact of the CivilCode amendment (Kawaide 2021: 34).This limitation on the debate could also beread by the statement of another member of the council that, “since thisis a legaldiscussion, priority should be placed on normative evaluation as alegal concept, rather than placing undue emphasis on social realitiesandbiological perspectives” (Ministry of Justice 2020a: 16). However, thisamendment was also justified based on policy judgmentand consistency with thenew Civil Code that defined juveniles between the ages of 18 and 19 asindividuals with autonomous decision-makingcapacity, expecting them toparticipate in social activities and play a role as civic members from an earlystage (Kawaide 2021:37). In this discussion, juveniles’ maturity leveland mental growth process were not considered the main concerns, cedingplace toconcerns over how those defined as adults under the new Civil Code should betreated in the overall legal system (Kawaide2021: 37). While the minimum agefor drinking, smoking, and gambling remains 20 because these activities aredetrimental to healthduring the physical growth process, the scientificinsights, including perspectives on the growth process of the mind and maturity,did not find a place in the juvenile justice system. Rather, policy judgment washeavily weighted, and gaining “public understanding”was a mainconcern of the discussion (Kawaide 2021: 49). Thus, gaining public acceptance oflegal reform was prioritized over clearingup the existing publicmisunderstanding on juvenile delinquency. This amendment was apparently promotedas a political and policymatter, rather than a legal necessity. That said, thediscussion did not focus on the actual situation of juveniles aged 18 and 19whowould be affected most by this amendment (except for the victims). By loweringthe age of majority from 20 to 18 in the CivilCode, they are expected or evenpressured to become individuals with autonomous decision-making capacity and tocontribute to society.However, as the opponents of the amendment recite, recentneuroscientific findings have proved the opposite about the maturationprocess(Arain et al. 2013), and it is questionable whether the legal change will have apositive effect on their mental development.

In the 1970s in the UK, a judge justified the punitive stance on youthviolent crimes, addressing the need for courts to be sensitiveto public opinionand not to lose public respect and confidence (Hall et al. 2013: 37). Althoughgaining public respect and understandingis a vital prerequisite for the stateand the legal system, legal reform needs to be conducted in anticipation of thepossible consequencesof its policies. In terms of crime deterrence, severalstudies in the US (Harding et al. 2019; Redding 2010) proved that severepunishment,including imprisonment, does not deter future crimes. Specifically,Redding (2010) found that transferring justice-involved youthto adult prisonsand treating them as adult inmates promotes recidivism and harms their mentalhealth. These studies elucidate thata punitive stance toward juvenile crimeproduces negative outcomes because there is no solid evidence to indicate thatpunitive interventionis effective in crime prevention, especially forjustice-involved youth who are in the process of maturing. The limitation of thestudy is its lack of data, such as the real voices of former justice-involvedjuveniles and those around them, and it is essentialto investigate whether andhow this legal reform will change the attitudes of juvenile delinquents and whatthe consequences of thisamendment will be. Such insights will likely beinstrumental in guiding research and policymaking on the global stage, both inJapanand internationally.

Conclusion

In the midst of a major social upheaval, several amendments related tojuvenile law have been enacted over the past 20 years. TheJuvenile Actis one of the measures that establishes a boundary between adults and children.Hence, the amendments and public misunderstandingof the current situationultimately led to the wave of adultification that changed in the concepts ofchildhood and of children’srights and responsibilities; children in Japancame to be considered more responsible, autonomous, and independent individualsthanin previous years. This study explained that adultification did notvoluntarily arise from children themselves but was, intentionallyorunintentionally, conducted by external forces, particularly the media and thecentral government. Consequently, children are forcedto become adults when theyshould still be educated and supported by society, and they are pushed to acceptresponsibility for theiractions and are expected to behave well and controltheir emotions.

The 2022 amendment to the Juvenile Act sets a five-year period ofobservation. This study argues that this amendment heavily focused on the policyjudgment perspectivesand expectations of an imagined, ideal young adult withautonomous decision-making, while downplaying scientific insights, data,and thevoices of delinquents or reformed delinquents. The next five years will requiremore empirical research on the lived experiencesand voices of those affected bythis amendment, including the young and juvenile delinquents in their teens andformer delinquentsbefore and after this legal transition.

Correspondence: Dr Yoshie Udagawa, Project Researcher, Tokyo College,The University of Tokyo, Japan. yoshieudagawa@hotmail.com

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